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I. INTRODUCTION
HIS Article reviews judicial developments in Texas environmental
law between October 1, 1998 and September 31, 1999, as well as
the new environmental legislation enacted in Texas during this
same Survey period.
II. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS
During the Survey period, Texas appellate courts and a federal district
court heard several environmental cases both under Texas environmental
statutes and Texas common law. The first case involved a challenge to
the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission's ("TNRCC")
power to utilize a registration process for management of municipal
waste in lieu of a formal permitting process. The second case arose in a
lakeside resident's challenge of a TNRCC order allowing increased with-
drawal of water from a lake and addressed the citizens' standing and the
requirements of the TNRCC to hear new evidence on remand from the
district court. Two cases arose in landowner suits against parties who
were allegedly liable for contamination of land and addressed the de-
fenses of lack of transfer of claims between a seller and current owner of
property and the application of the discovery rule to statutes of limita-
tions. Finally, two cases addressed the ability of contractors or subcon-
tractors to recover against the TNRCC for alleged breach of contract.
These cases address situations in which sovereign immunity is waived or
not waived for purposes of contract claims against the state.
A. TNRCC AUTHORITY TO ALLOW REGULATED ACTIVITY
WITHOUT A PERMIT
1. The TNRCC Has the Authority under the Texas Solid Waste
Disposal Act to Allow the Disposal of Sewage Sludge Wastes
Without Implementing a General Permitting Process
"Not in my backyard" (sometimes known by the acronym "NIMBY")1
1. Whether the expression "not in my backyard" or NIMBY has positive or negative
connotations may depend on who is using it. See, e.g., Geo-Tech Reclamation Indus., Inc.
v. Hamrick, 886 F.2d 662, 666 (4th Cir. 1989) ("[M]any who speak out against [a waste
disposal site] will do so because of self-interest, bias, or ignorance. These are but a few of
the less than noble motivations commonly referred to as the 'Not-in-My-Backyard' syn-
drome."); but cf. SDDS, Inc. v. South Dakota, 47 F.3d 263, 266 (8th Cir. 1995) ("NIMBY
(not in my backyard) exists because people do not want their soil, air and water contami-




is a frequently-heard cry from residents who live near proposed waste
disposal sites. Those who protest against such sites typically invoke so-
cial, technical, and/or legal arguments, with the latter sometimes hinging
on procedural technicalities. Such procedural issues were central to Mc-
Daniel v. Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission,2 in which a
landowner, Elton McDaniel, protested the TNRCC's approval of a sew-
age sludge disposal site on land owned by Cary Juby which was adjacent
to McDaniel's land. Juby had applied to the TNRCC to register the site,
and the TNRCC-after sending notice of the application to the local
county judge and to McDaniel and other adjacent landowners-approved
the application and issued the registration to Juby.
In seeking to set aside the decision of the TNRCC to issue the registra-
tion to Juby, McDaniel raised two basic arguments. First, McDaniel ar-
gued that under the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act (TSWDA), 3 the
TNRCC was required to utilize the more restrictive and time-consuming
general permitting process, as opposed to merely the notice and registra-
tion process, before deciding whether to allow the sludge disposal. Sec-
ond, McDaniel argued that the notice that he and the other adjacent
landowners received was insufficient because Juby did not state his busi-
ness affiliation clearly enough, even though a reference was made to a
similar name. The court's analysis reflects an interesting consideration of
the actual and implied powers of the TNRCC or any other Texas adminis-
trative agency.
a. The TNRCC May Allow Sewage Sludge Disposal by
Registration-Specific and Implied Statutory Powers of an
Administrative Agency
The first issue raised by McDaniel was whether the TNRCC was obli-
gated under the TSWDA to invoke a general permitting procedure for
issuing authorization for the spreading of sewage sludge. Under the stat-
ute, the sewage sludge was classified as municipal solid waste. The statu-
tory language was fairly broad as to the agency's powers related to
municipal solid waste. In reviewing the statutory powers of the TNRCC
under these provisions of the TSWDA, the court stated that "[a]gencies
may only exercise those powers that are specifically given them by stat-
ute. However, agencies also have implied powers to do that which is nec-
essary to carry out the specific powers delegated, for the legislature
intended a workable and effective exercise of the powers expressly and
specifically granted the agency."'4 The analysis then appears to be two-
fold. First, the court must determine whether specific powers are granted
to the administrative agency. Second, the court must determine whether
2. 982 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied).
3. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 361.001 - .754 (Vernon 1992 & Supp.
2000).
4. McDaniel, 982 S.W.2d at 651-52 (citing Sexton v. Mount Olivet Cemetery Ass'n,
720 S.W.2d 129, 137-39 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
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there are certain powers needed to carry out the specific statutory pow-
ers. In other words, what must the agency be allowed to do in order to
carry out its legislatively delegated authority and duty?
In carrying out this review of statutory authority, the first step requires
determining legislative intent. The court determined, based on prior pre-
cedent, that in carrying out such review it must look to the statute as a
whole to ascertain legislative intent. 5 Reviewing the provisions governing
the regulation of municipal solid waste, the McDaniel court concluded
that the legislative grant of jurisdiction was broad enough to control all
aspects of the management of municipal solid waste, including sewage
sludge. 6 One of the provisions provided that the TNRCC could issue per-
mits for management of municipal solid waste. The court concluded,
however, that the grant uses permissive language: "Except as provided
by 361.090 with regard to certain industrial solid waste, the commission
may require and issue permits authorizing and governing the construc-
tion, operation, and maintenance of solid waste facilities used to store,
process, or dispose of solid waste."'7
Concluding that the provision was permissive and not mandatory, the
court decided that a formal permitting process was not mandated by this
statutory language. The McDaniel court reasoned that "if the legislature
intended the TNRCC to only issue permits when regulating municipal
solid waste, it could have so mandated, as it has done in other areas."
8
The court concluded that the procedures the TNRCC followed fulfilled
its obligation under the statute. 9
The TNRCC is given general authority over municipal solid waste, al-
lowing it "to control and manage all aspects of municipal solid waste by
all practical means as long as such methods are consistent with its powers
and duties" under the TSWDA.10 The registration process was deemed
sufficient to control and manage the sewage sludge. The registration pro-
cess was conducted using a process established pursuant to TNRCC's
properly promulgated rules. The process consists of the following steps:
written notice to the TNRCC from the applicant of the planned land ap-
plication for beneficial use and submission of information enabling the
TNRCC to determine whether such activities comply with its rules.1 The
TNRCC may approve a request for registration only after reviewing the
request to ensure that it complies with the applicable TNRCC rules gov-
erning sewage sludge. These rules include limits on the concentration of
5. See id. at 651-52.
6. See id. at 652.
7. Id. (quoting TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.061 (Vernon Supp. 1999)
(emphasis added by the McDaniel court)).
8. Id. at 653 (emphasis added). As noted by the McDaniel court, TSWDA does re-
quire a permitting process for hazardous, as opposed to non-hazardous municipal waste.
See id.; TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.002(b) (Vernon 1992).
9. See McDaniel, 982 S.W.2d at 653.
10. Id. at 653 (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.011 (Vernon Supp.
2000)).
11. See 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 312.12(a) (1999).
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metals, restrictions on available sites, and several specific actions for bulk
sewage sludge treatment.12 Based upon this review, if the TNRCC ap-
proves the request, notice must be mailed to the county judge in the
county of the proposed disposal site and to adjacent landowners. 13 Any
dissatisfied person can provide written comments to the TNRCC and file
a motion for reconsideration of the decision. 14
While noting that the registration is not as stringent as a permitting
process, the court concluded that the agency's decision to implement a
registration process rather than a permitting process was reasonable and
consistent with both its powers and duties under the relevant statutory
provisions.' 5 The operative issue here apparently turned on the language
governing the promulgation of rules requiring permits for municipal
sludge land spreading facilities. The language contains the term "may"
rather than "shall.' 6 Thus, the court clearly did not believe that the stat-
ute mandated a permitting system. Without such a mandate, the court
considered the registration adequate to address the sewage sludge pro-
cess and protect human health and the environment.
b. Notice to Adjacent Landowners That Merely Listed the Waste
Registration Applicant's Name Was Sufficient
TNRCC rules require that notices to adjacent landowners of a solid
waste registration application specify both the name and affiliation of the
applicant.' 7 While the application reflected the applicant's affiliation, the
notice issued to McDaniel and to the other adjacent landowners omitted
the reference in the application to the TNRCC that it "did business as"
Cap. Tex. Waste Service.' 8 McDaniel claimed that this omission violated
the notice rules and that the violation invalidated the TNRCC's decision
to grant the registration.
The McDaniel court found it unnecessary to determine whether the
omission of the reference to Cap. Tex. Waste Service constituted an omis-
sion of an applicant's affiliation under the TNRCC rules, since even if it
did constitute such an omission, the court could only reverse and remand
the TNRCC's decision if a showing was made that prejudice or harm re-
sulted from the omission.' 9 With respect to McDaniel himself, no such
harm was shown; indeed, McDaniel admitted that he had actual knowl-
edge of the affiliation between Juby and Tex. Cap. Waste Service.20
12. See id. §§ 312.12(b), .42.
13. See id. § 312.13(c).
14. See id. § 312.13(d)-(e).
15. See McDaniel, 982 S.W.2d at 653.
16. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.061 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
17. See 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 312.13(c)(4) (1999).
18. See McDaniel, 982 S.W.2d at 653.
19. See id. at 654 (citing Imperial Am. Resources Fund, Inc. v. Railroad Comm'n, 557




McDaniel further argued, however, that other adjacent landowners
were harmed since, had they received notice that Juby was associated
with Tex. Cap. Waste Service, they would have expressed their own con-
cerns. The court declined to address this issue because even if such harm
were present McDaniel did not have standing to assert prejudice to a
third party for alleged notification defects.21
The McDaniel court affirmed the trial court's granting summary judg-
ment and rendering a final judgement in favor of the TNRCC. 22 In doing
so, the McDaniel court in effect affirmed that a person objecting to a
waste disposal site should not necessarily rely upon a court to use admin-
istrative technicalities to halt the operation.
B. CITIZEN STANDING
1. A Conservation Organization Has Standing to Maintain an Action
Against the TNRCC Based on the Effect on the Organization's
Members of the TNRCC's Order Amending a Water District's
Authority to Divert Water from a Lake; However, the Agency May
Reconsider an Erroneously Issued Order Based upon the Existing
Record
An environmental group's standing to protest agency action and the
TNRCC's ability to reconsider erroneously issued orders were at issue in
Lake Medina Conservation Society, Inc. v. Texas Natural Resource Con-
servation Commission.23 In Lake Medina, a local environmental group
opposed a water control and improvement district's application to expand
its use of the water it diverted from Lake Medina. The certificate of adju-
dication issued to the Bexar-Medina-Atascosa Counties Water Control
and Improvement District No. 1 ("BMA") allowed it to divert 65,830
acre-feet of water from the lake, but limited the use of that water to irri-
gation purposes. The BMA applied to the TNRCC for an amendment to
expand the permitted uses to include municipal and industrial purposes.
The environmental group was made up of lakefront property or busi-
ness owners and those with water wells near the lake and was known as
the Lake Medina Conservation Society, Inc. (LAMCOS). LAMCOS
feared that, although the amendment neither increased the total author-
ized volume nor added any additional diversion points, the additional au-
thorized uses would "result in BMA's consistently taking the entire
volume of water it is authorized to use" and thus would adversely affect
their own recreational and other uses of the lake.24 LAMCOS, among
other interested groups, opposed BMA's requested amendment during
public hearings. While the TNRCC agreed with LAMCOS that the
21. See id. (citing Smith v. Houston Chem. Serv., Inc., 872 S.W.2d 252, 273 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1994, writ denied)).
22. See McDaniel, 982 S.W.2d at 654.
23. 980 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied).
24. Id. at 514. While not explicitly stated, the court implied that the demand for water
for irrigation uses was such that the BMA historically had not utilized its entire allotment.
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amendment would likely result in increased water diversion, the agency
granted BMA's request. TNRC concluded that BMA's water resources
were a part of limited water resources in the region and, because of in-
creased urbanization and reduced agricultural activity in the area, the
TNRCC would allow a portion of BMA's water to be used beneficially to
supplement limited municipal and industrial groundwater supplies in the
region. 25
A district court battle ensued in which LAMCOS won at least a partial
victory.26 In an initial holding, the district court agreed that the law re-
quired that BMA's certificate set forth a specific volume of water for
each authorized use and remanded. 27 Upon remand, the TNRCC, con-
sidering only the existing record, allowed BMA to divert up to 19,974
acre-feet of water for municipal use and the remaining 45,856 acre-feet
for irrigation.28 LAMCOS sued for judicial review again, claiming that,
because BMA had not filed a completely new application and the
TNRCC had not held a new evidentiary hearing, the TNRCC's new order
was void. In response, BMA challenged LAMCOS's standing to contest
the TNRCC's new order. The district court rejected BMA's standing
challenge, but upheld the TNRCC's order.29
a. Standing to Challenge the TNRCC Order
BMA, joined by the Canyon Regional Water Authority as intervenor,
argued that LAMCOS's interests were "insufficient to show any specific
or peculiar injury to itself or its members as a result of the [TNRCC's]
amending BMA's certificate. '30 Disagreeing with BMA, the appeals
court recited Texas law on standing and applied it to LAMCOS. The
court relied upon the Texas Supreme Court case Hunt v. Bass for the
general rule on standing that the ability to bring suit "consists of some
interest peculiar to the person individually and not as a member of the
general public."' 31 The Houston Court of Appeals recited the circum-
stances in which a plaintiff has standing to sue:
(1) he has sustained, or is immediately in danger of sustaining, some
direct injury as a result of the wrongful act of which he complains;
(2) he has a direct relationship between the alleged injury and claim
sought to be adjudicated; (3) he has a personal stake in the contro-
versy; (4) the challenged action has caused the plaintiff some injury
in fact, either economic, recreational, environmental, or otherwise;
or (5) he is an appropriate party to assert the public's interest in the
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id. (citing Act of June 16, 1977, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 870, § 1, 1977 Tex. Gen.
Laws 2217 (codified as amended at TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.023(e) (Vernon Supp.
2000)).
28. See id. at 515. After the remand, BMA withdrew its request for industrial use of
the water.
29. See Lake Medina, 980 S.W.2d at 515.
30. Id.
31. Hunt v. Bass, 664 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Tex. 1984).
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matter, as well as his own interest.32
In applying this standard to the LAMCOS standing question, the court
concluded that the members of that group had demonstrated interests in
the lake, not the least of which was ownership interest in lakefront prop-
erty, that would be affected by the amendment to the certificate of adju-
dication governing water use. The court's analysis was simple: "[t]he
impact of lower lake levels on owners of waterfront property, waterfront
businesses, and private wells in the area constitutes a sufficiently particu-
larized injury to distinguish the members' injury from that of the public at
large."'33 The appeals court thus overruled BMA's and intervenor Can-
yon Regional Water Authority's challenges to LAMCOS's standing.34
b. Reconsideration of the Previous Application Based upon the
Existing Record
Another challenge brought by the landowners group was that the
TNRCC improperly reconsidered BMA's application to expand the use
of its diverted water. This claim was supported by four arguments: first,
that an administrative agency lacks the jurisdiction to modify its previous
orders absent a statute conferring that authority; second, that the
TNRCC did not follow its procedural rules that govern how an applicant
must amend water-use authorizations; third, that in relying on the ex-
isting record after remand, the TNRCC denied LAMCOS a full and fair
hearing and improperly based its decision on outdated evidence; and
fourth, that the TNRCC had failed to determine the impact that a reduc-
tion in water levels would have on fish and wildlife habitat.
(i) The TNRCC's Authority to Modify a Previous Order
LAMCOS cited Sexton v. Mount Olivet Cemetery Ass'n35 for the pro-
position that an administrative agency lacks the authority to modify its
previous final orders absent a statute conferring that authority. 36 How-
ever, the Lake Medina court found Sexton to be inapplicable, since, due
to an embedded error in the original order (i.e., a failure to set forth a
specific volume of water for each authorized use), the order was never
final or legally effective. Thus, the TNRCC not only had the authority
but also had the statutory duty to reassess BMA's application.37
32. Billy B., Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Galveston Wharves, 717 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ); see also Housing Auth. v. Texas ex rel. Velasquez,
539 S.W.2d 911, 913-14 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
33. Lake Medina, 980 S.W.2d at 516 (citing Hooks v. Texas Dep't Water Resources,
611 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tex. 1981); Texas Rivers Protection Ass'n v. Texas Natural Resource
Conservation Comm'n, 910 S.W.2d 147, 151 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, writ denied)).
34. See id.
35. 720 S.W.2d 129, 137 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).




(ii) The TNRCC's Procedural Rules Governing Amendments to
Water Use Authorizations
LAMCOS argued that the TNRCC violated two agency rules gov-
erning procedures for amending water use permits. The first, rule 295.2,
provides that "substantive changes" to an application to amend a water
use authorization must be "in the form of a written, notarized amend-
ment . . ., provided, however, that no substantive changes may be made
after an application has been filed with the chief clerk .... -38 The sec-
ond, rule 295.201, provides that "[n]o substantive changes may be made
[to an application] after an application has been filed with the chief
clerk."' 39 LAMCOS argued that these rules required BMA to "withdraw
its application and submit a new, amended application. '40
The Lake Medina court did not disagree that these two rules may not
have been followed by the TNRCC. It concluded, however, that the rules
were not designed primarily to confer procedural benefits upon or pro-
tections to a party to the case. 41 Instead, the intent of the rules was to
assist the agency itself in the efficient processing of the applications. The
TNRCC was "therefore free to relax the requirements of the rules, and
the agency's doing so in a particular case is 'not reviewable except upon a
showing of substantial prejudice to the complaining party." 42 The court
concluded that LAMCOS had shown no prejudice. 43
(iii) The TNRCC's Reliance upon the Existing Record
LAMCOS next argued that it was deprived of a "full and fair hearing"
since the TNRCC, in reviewing BMA's amended application, relied
merely upon the existing record.44 Most specifically, LAMCOS argued
that the findings of fact and conclusions of law as found in the original
order were deficient because they "do not take into consideration the
changes that have taken place in the watershed in question since [the
order was originally considered], with respect to the water level in Lake
Medina, the drought in the area, increased knowledge of the relationship
between Lake Medina and the Edwards Aquifer, or the changes in de-
mands for the water. '45 The court concluded, however, that the TNRCC
did not abuse its discretion in not considering such new evidence.
In applying its view of the law on this subject, the Austin Court of Ap-
peals stated that a decision whether to reopen evidence in an administra-
tive proceeding is within that agency's discretion, and that ability is
38. Id. at 517 (citing 30 TEX. AEMIN. CODE § 295.2 (1999)).
39. 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 295.201 (1999).
40. Lake Medina, 980 S.W.2d at 517.
41. See id.
42. Id. (quoting Smith v. Houston Chem. Servs., Inc., 872 S.W.2d 252, 259 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1994, writ denied)).
43. See id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 518.
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reserved for a variety of "extraordinary circumstances. '46 Applying this
concept to the case at hand, the court held that where re-opening the
evidence is urged by a party who was successful on appeal in gaining a
judicial remand to an agency, "the agency need consider only those parts
of its decision which were rejected by the reviewing court." 47
The [TNRCC], on remand, complied in its [new] order with the re-
viewing court's decision that specific volumes of water for each use
must be set out in the final order. Moreover, the [TNRCC] could
reasonably conclude from the record that the changed circumstances
urged by LAMCOS did not affect the fundamental ground of deci-
sion reflected in the findings of fact and conclusions of law stated in
the [original] order: that in the circumstances shown municipal and
irrigation uses must have priority, as a matter of policy, over recrea-
tional use and well-water availability-a basis of the agency decision
not rejected by any court. 48
(iv) Consideration of the Impact on Fish and Wildlife Habitats
As a final argument, LAMCOS argued that the TNRCC did not, in
considering BMA's amended application, follow its rule which required
that it "assess the effects, if any, of the issuance of the permit on fish and
wildlife habitats."'49 However, since the TNRCC had found that the orig-
inal application would have no significant impact on fish and wildlife
habitat, this argument fell to the court's logic: "LAMCOS does not sug-
gest how BMA's new application, which gives BMA less flexibility in its
diversion of water, could result in a different or more severe impact upon
fish and wildlife habitats." 50
Thus, the Lake Medina court, in considering this final procedural issue
as well as the others, did not necessarily dispute that a given administra-
tive procedure was not strictly followed by the TNRCC in reconsidering
BMA's application. However, the court was not inclined to allow such
legal technicalities to interfere with the agency's action, absent a strong
showing that the environmental group had suffered prejudice from such
omissions.
46. Lake Medina, 980 S.W.2d at 518-19 (citing KOCH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
PRACTICE, § 5.71[1] at 273 (1998)).
47. Id. at 519 (quoting KOCH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE, § 5.71[1] at 276
(1998)).
48. Id. (citing Cross-Sound Ferry Servs., Inc. v. ICC, 934 F.2d 327, 332 (D.C. Cir.
1991); Alvarez-Madrigal v. INS, 808 F.2d 705, 707 (9th Cir. 1987); Sunset Square Ltd. v.
Miami County Bd. of Revision, 552 N.E.2d 632, 635 (Ohio 1990)).
49. Id. (quoting 30 TEX. ADMIN. CoIE § 297.49 (1997)).
50. Lake Medina, 980 S.W.2d at 519 (emphasis in original).
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C. TORT CLAIMS FOR CONTAMINATION OF LAND
1. Texas Law Bars a Purchaser of Real Property from Asserting a
Claim for Property Damage If That Damage Occurred Before the
Purchaser Owned the Property and the Cause of Action Was Not
Transferred to the Purchaser
In Koehn v. Ayers, 51 the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas granted summary judgment against personal injury and
property damage claims brought by individuals who bought land in 1992.
The claims were based upon disposal of material into a saltwater disposal
pit on the land which was in operation from the mid-1930s through the
1960s. District Judge Kent 52 dismissed all claims against the oil company
defendants with prejudice. 53 In doing so, he articulated aspects of Texas
law that relate to issues of environmental liability associated with oil and
gas activities and real estate transactions.
The defendants in Koehn included (a) Texaco, which executed a lease
of the property for oil and gas operations in 1933, and in 1936 placed,
with the then-owners' consent, a disposal pit on the property to dispose of
waste saltwater from those operations, (b) North Central Oil Company
(NCOC), which purchased the lease in 1994 from Texaco and assumed
Texaco's liabilities in connection with the lease, and (c) the "sellers," who
bought the property in 1950 from the original owners and later sold the
property to the plaintiffs.
With respect to the plaintiffs' personal injury claims, the court pointed
out that the plaintiffs had presented no evidence of groundwater contam-
ination and no evidence of dangerous levels of hydrocarbons in surface
water on the property. With respect to medical causation, expert reports
submitted by the plaintiffs contained only "generalized statements about
51. 26 F. Supp. 2d 953 (S.D. Tex. 1998), aff'd, 194 F.3d 1309 (5th Cir. 1999) (unpub-
lished table decision).
52. Perhaps because of his court's location near industrial centers and near environ-
mentally sensitive coastal areas, Judge Kent has decided a large number of substantive
environmental cases. See, e.g., Galveston Bay Conservation and Preservation Ass'n v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 55 F. Supp. 2d 658 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (wetlands permits); Informed
Citizens United, Inc. v. USX Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 375 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (Clean Water Act
discharge permit); Blue Gulf Seafood, Inc. v. TransTexas Gas Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 732(S.D. Tex. 1998) (damage to oyster beds from oil and gas operations); Stewart v. Potts,
996 F. Supp. 668 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (Clean Water Act discharge permit); Texas Shrimp Ass'n
v. Daley, 984 F. Supp. 1023 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (endangered sea turtles); Stewart v. Potts,
983 F. Supp. 678 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (wetlands permits); Clear Lake Properties v. Rockwell
Int'l Corp., 959 F. Supp. 763 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (Superfund liability); Amoco Chem. Co. v.
Tex Tin Corp., 925 F. Supp. 1192 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (Superfund liability); Center for Marine
Conservation v. Brown, 917 F. Supp. 1128 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (endangered sea turtles);
Amoco Chem. Co. v. Tex Tin Corp., 902 F. Supp. 730 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (Superfund liability);
United States v. Lowe, 864 F. Supp. 628 (S.D. Tex. 1994), affd, 118 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. 1997)(Superfund liability); Avitts v. Amoco Prod. Co., 840 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D. Tex. 1994), va-
cated, 1995 WL 258347 (5th Cir. May 3, 1995) (oilfield contamination); United States v.
Van Leuzen, 816 F. Supp. 1171 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (wetlands); United States v. Alexander,
771 F. Supp. 830 (S.D. Tex. 1991), vacated, 981 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1993) (Superfund
liability).
53. See Koehn, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 958.
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the link between some toxins allegedly in the pit" and the complained-of
illnesses.54 Indeed, Judge Kent viewed the plaintiffs' evidence on this
point as particularly weak:
Neither expert appears to have actually examined the individual
Plaintiffs, considered their medical history, or offered any substanti-
ated conclusions about the medical probability that these Plaintiffs'
injuries were caused in whole or even in part by exposure to environ-
mental toxins. None of the reports submitted by the [Plaintiffs] even
suggest that they are a statistical anomaly representing a higher than
normal incidence of the various conditions they complain of.55
What would have been required at a minimum under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure with respect to medical causation, and what the plain-
tiffs had not shown, was an opinion from at least one doctor that there
was "a reasonable medical probability that the specific illnesses com-
plained of by the individual Plaintiffs resulted from exposure to toxins
associated with the pit. ' 56
Consideration of plaintiffs' property damage claims focused on Texas
law. The court agreed with the defendants' argument that, unless a deed
expressly transfers a cause of action to a purchaser, Texas law bars that
purchaser from asserting claims for property damage that occurred
before the purchaser owned the property.57 Furthermore, even if such a
transfer of rights had been effected by the deed, a two-year statute of
limitations barred the property damage claims. 58 The evidence suggested
that the pit was open and operating in the 1950s when the property was
owned by the Sellers, but that it was closed by 1965 and subsequently was
covered over by vegetation. Characterizing any injury caused by the pit
as permanent, not temporary, in nature, the court noted that a right of
action for such permanent injury under Texas law would have accrued to
the Sellers when the injury first affected the land.59 According to the
court, the Sellers, having owned the property in the 1950s, would un-
doubtedly have been aware of the pit's presence. Interestingly, the court
viewed the fact that the plaintiffs had not discovered the pit until three
years after they purchased the property in 1992 as evidence that the pit
had lain idle for decades. The delayed discovery was thus evidence that
54. Id. at 956.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 955-56 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325
(1986); Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 199 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that
"[scientific knowledge of the harmful level of exposure to a chemical, plus knowledge that
the plaintiff was exposed to such quantities, are minimal facts necessary to sustain the
plaintiffs' burden in a toxic tort case.")).
57. See id. at 957 (citing Lay v. Aetna Ins. Co., 599 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("A cause of action for injury to real property ... is a per-
sonal right which belongs to the person who owns the property at the time of injury and...
[w]ithout express provision, the right does not pass to a subsequent purchaser of the
property.").
58. See id.
59. See Koehn, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 957 (citing Vann v. Bowie Sewerage Co., 90 S.W.2d
561, 562 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1936)).
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the limitations period had expired and did not provide grounds to invoke
the discovery rule.60 Due to the "hidden" nature of the property damage
at issue, limitations periods are frequently tolled in environmental cases.
But the court here did not toll the limitations period and instead focused
on the evidence that the pit was, in the 1950s at least, of an open and
obvious nature.
Finally, the plaintiffs had also alleged-at least in a general way-that
Texaco and NCOC had violated environmental statutes. These allega-
tions, however, merely consisted of a statement in the plaintiffs' pleadings
that "there exists the possibility that [Texaco and NCOC] are an operator
of a facility in which a chemical spill occurred for which they will be re-
sponsible for conducting a clean up."'6 1 Such a general statement, in the
absence of any credible evidence that a spill had occurred, was insuffi-
cient as a matter of law to raise any factual dispute over violations of
environmental statutes.62
In addition to dismissing with prejudice the plaintiffs' claims against
the corporate defendants, Judge Kent ordered the parties "to file no fur-
ther pleadings before this Court regarding these Defendants, particularly
including motions to reconsider and the like, unless supported by compel-
ling new evidence .... ",63 With the plaintiffs' claims being so strongly
dismissed, the written decision in Koehn, besides articulating concepts of
Texas property law, also stands as an admonition to others who may bring
environmental claims that are not well grounded or well pled.
2. The Presence of Industrial Waste at a Landfill was Discoverable by
the Exercise of Reasonable Diligence; Thus, Absent Fraudulent
Concealment, the Statute of Limitations Barred a Claim by a Lessor
Against a Landfill Operator-Tenant
In Texas Industries, Inc. v. City of Dallas,64 the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh District (Eastland), considered a breach of contract action
between Texas Industries, Inc. (TXI), and its lessee, the city of Dallas
("City"). The City had leased TXI's land for use as a municipal solid
waste landfill in 1973. Sometime after 1973, but before the City renewed
its lease in 1977, the City disposed of waste, including battery casing chips
and lead slag, generated by RSR Corporation (RSR) at its nearby lead
smelter. 65
In 1994, contamination from the disposal of lead smelting waste was
discovered and in 1995, the United States Environmental Protection
Agency placed the property on the National Priorities List. Within a
60. See id.
61. Id. (quoting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment) (alterations in original).
62. See id.
63. Id. at 958 (emphasis in original).
64. 1 S.W.3d 792 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1999, pet. denied).
65. The battery casing chips and lead slag would be considered "industrial solid waste"
instead of "municipal solid waste." See id. at 793 (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. §§ 361.003(16), .003(20) (Vernon Supp. 1999)).
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month of this listing, TXI filed the breach of contract suit against the
City. The court noted that, although the EPA identified the City as a
potentially responsible party and requested it to investigate and remedi-
ate the property, the City had not done so. 6
6
Although the trial court found that the City had breached its agree-
ment, it held that TXI's claims were barred by the four-year statute of
limitations applicable to contracts. 67 As explained below, the Texas In-
dustries court found that the limitations period was not tolled either by
the discovery rule or by fraudulent concealment.
a. The City's Disposal of Battery Casing Chips and Lead Slag Was
Not the Type of Injury That Is Inherently Undiscoverable
In evaluating the application of the discovery rule to determine if the
statute of limitations would be tolled, the appellate court cited a recent
articulation of the application of the discovery rule by the Texas Supreme
Court:
The discovery rule exception to the statute of limitations will apply
where the nature of the injury incurred is inherently undiscoverable
and the evidence of the injury is objectively verifiable .... The re-
quirement of inherent discoverability recognizes that the discovery
rule exception [to the statute of limitations] should be permitted only
in circumstances where it is difficult for the injured party to learn of
the negligent act or omission.68
Turning to the facts of the case, the court reasoned that the injury of
which TXI complained was not "the type of injury that [was] inherently
undiscoverable.' '69 The court recognized that the lease provided for dis-
posal of municipal waste, not industrial waste, from a smelter. The ques-
tion was what evidence, if any, was observable and would have indicated
the waste disposal. The court focused on the fact that TXI had the oppor-
tunity to inspect the property during and at the termination of the lease.
One of the key pieces of evidence cited by the court was an engineering
inspection report from the Texas State Department of Health dated No-
vember 15, 1973. This report stated that the inspector "observed a pile of
'storage battery debris' adjacent to a road and that the property was lined
'with storage battery crushed casings and lead plates." 70
In response to the information stated in the report, TXI argued that the
report itself was not available to the public until many years later when
the Texas Open Records Act was enacted. The court responded, in es-
sence, that the availability of the report itself was not the issue. The court
focused instead on the observation of the inspector of what was present
at the property at the relevant time. The evidence thus showed that
66. See Texas Indus. 1 S.W.3d at 793.
67. See id.; see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.051 (Vernon 1997).






"even [a] routine inspection would have revealed the deposit of industrial
waste."' 7' Because, in the opinion of the court, the disposal of the indus-
trial waste from the smelter was readily observable to someone who in-
spected the property, the court held that the disposal of the battery
casings and other smelter waste is the type of injury that is discoverable
by the exercise of reasonable diligence. Consequently, the court ruled
that the discovery exception did not apply.72
The alleged breach of the contract, the lease, was the disposal of indus-
trial waste at the property. The court implied that a routine inspection
would have led to the discovery that the contract had been breached.
The court did not discuss whether the average person would have known
the difference between "municipal" waste versus "industrial" waste. A
relevant question is whether batteries and casings were disposed of in
municipal landfills on a regular basis at the time in question, such that
these wastes may have been viewed as common municipal waste at the
time. The plaintiff could have argued that it is not only whether the thing
is observable, but whether the import of the observation could be recog-
nized by the average person. If seeing a battery casing on the ground
does not raise the concerns of a landfill full of industrial smelter waste, is
the "injury" readily observable? These may be issues that attorneys de-
bate and courts analyze in the future.
b. Lack of Evidence of Fraudulent Concealment
TXI also argued that the City had fraudulently concealed the breach of
the contract, thus resulting in a tolling of the statute of limitations. How-
ever, TXI had submitted no summary judgement evidence of fraudulent
concealment. The cases cited by the court held that a party asserting
"fraudulent concealment as an affirmative defense to the statute of limi-
tations has the burden to raise it in response to the summary judgment
motion and to come forward with summary judgment evidence raising a
fact issue on each element of the fraudulent concealment defense. 73
Without any evidence, the court quickly dispensed with the assertion of
fraudulent concealment and affirmed the trial court's granting of sum-
mary judgment in favor of the City.74
71. Id. at 794-95.
72. See Texas Indus., 1 S.W.3d at 795.
73. Id. at 795 (citing KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison County Hous. Fin. Corp., 988
S.W.2d 746 (Tex. 1999)).
74. See id. at 794-95.
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D. PRIVATE ENTITIES CONTRACTING WITH THE TEXAS NATURAL
RESOURCE CONSERVATION COMMISSION
1. Discontinuance of Texas's Automobile Emissions Testing Program
Did Not Violate the Texas or United States Constitutions; The State
of Texas Had Sovereign Immunity from Contractual Suit from
Operators of Local Emissions Testing Facilities
In the early 1990s, the Texas Legislature pursuant to EPA mandates
provided the TNRCC express authorization to contract with private enti-
ties to implement its new, centralized vehicle emissions testing program
for the state's urban areas that had not attained national standards for
ozone concentrations in ambient air.75 The TNRCC contracted with two
such entities, Tejas Testing One and Tejas Testing Two (collectively
"Tejas"), to manage the program, and Tejas in turn contracted with local
operating contractors to actually run the individual testing facilities.
When that program was canceled and replaced with a decentralized pro-
gram in 1995,76 Tejas and the operating contractors filed a suit against the
TNRCC for their lost profits,77 alleging (1) that the TNRCC had
breached its contracts and (2) that the Texas Legislature's actions in re-
pealing the program were an unconstitutional impairment of contract
under both the Texas and United States Constitutions and an unconstitu-
tional taking and unconstitutional retroactive law under the Texas Consti-
tution.78 While Tejas and the operating contractors lost their breach of
contract claims, they won a multi-million dollar judgment against the
TNRCC on the basis of their constitutional claims. Tejas settled with the
state after the judgment. The dispute between the operating contractors
and the state, however, continued and resulted in the Austin court of ap-
peals issuing a decision in State v. Operating Contractors.79
The court in Operating Contractors considered both the State's appeal
of the constitutional holdings and the operating contractors' appeal of the
trial court's denial of their contractual claims8° and ultimately held in
favor of the state on both issues, affirming the trial court's decision. 81 A
more detailed discussion of the somewhat complex contractual and statu-
tory background and of the court's reasoning is presented below.
75. See State v. Operating Contractors, 985 S.W.2d 646, 648-50 (Tex. App.-Austin
1999, no pet. h.) (describing the legislative and procedural history that led up to the court
of appeal's case and citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 382.037(f) (Vernon
1999); Act of May 24, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S. ch. 547, § 2); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1994)
(mandating periodic testing of vehicle exhaust emissions in certain geographic areas).
76. See Act of May 1, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 34.
77. The operating contractors were reimbursed by Tejas for all start-up costs when the
program was repealed. See Operating Contractors, 985 S.W.2d at 650.
78. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 10; TEX. CONST. art. I, §§ 16-17.
79. See Operating Contractors, 985 S.W.2d at 646.
80. The operating contractors also challenged the exclusion of pre-judgement interest
from the trial court's decision.
81. See id. at 656.
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a. The Contractual Exculpatory Clauses and the Legislative
Termination of the Emissions Testing Program
The contracts between Tejas and the state, collectively referred to in
the litigation as "the Emissions Contract," were identical and established
Tejas as the managing contractor to construct and staff the individual test-
ing facilities. Pursuant to the Emissions Contract, Tejas entered into
leases and service agreements with forty-three operating contractors.
The operating contractors did not sign a contract directly with the State.
The Emissions Contract provided that the TNRCC could terminate the
contract if the emissions testing program were "repealed or substantially
amended. '82 In addition, the service agreements between the operating
contractors and Tejas contained an "exculpatory clause," referencing the
possible termination of the Emissions Contract. This exculpatory clause
stated that if the TNRCC or Tejas terminated the Emissions Contract, the
service agreement and leases would automatically terminate as well. In
the event of such termination, the service agreements provided that the
operating contractors were to have no claim for damages against Tejas or
the TNRCC.
The statutory action that ultimately ended the centralized emissions
program, Senate Bill 178,83 contained specific language concerning the
effect of that action on the contracts such that a change or amendment of
the vehicle inspection program would be considered "an amendment or
repeal of that program under any contract for implementation of that
program. '84 Senate Bill 178 also provided that such a change or amend-
ment was not to be construed as a waiver of the state's sovereign
immunity.8 5
As noted below, these contractual and legislative provisions were criti-
cal in the appellate court's rejection of the operating contractors' contrac-
tual and constitutional claims.
b. The Operating Contractors' Lack of "Vested Rights"
The operating contractors argued that their service agreements, operat-
ing in conjunction with the Emissions Agreement between Tejas and the
State, rose "to the level of a vested right; that each OC was essentially
awarded a franchise by the State."' 86 The state's actions, therefore, in in-
terfering with these agreements, operating contractors argued, consti-
tuted a "taking" of that vested right. While Texas courts have generally
denied "takings" claims based upon contractual rights, the operating con-
tractors argued that the service agreements, in conjunction with the Emis-
sions Contract, amounted to a vested property right and that Senate Bill
178 was, in effect, a taking of that right. The operating contractors cited
82. Id. at 649 (quoting Emissions Contract).
83. See Tex. S.B. 178, Act of May 1, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 34.
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. Operating Contractors, 985 S.W.2d at 651.
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two United States Supreme Court cases-United States Trust Co. v. New
Jersey87 and Lynch v. United States88-in support of their position. These
federal cases did hold that legislative repeal of covenants or agreements
between private entities and the federal government was invalid on con-
stitutional grounds. The Operating Contractors court, however, held that
they were distinguishable from the operating contractors' situation for
two reasons. First, the operating contractors did not have a contract di-
rectly with the state. Second, Senate Bill 178 was an exercise of the
state's police power to regulate air pollution, as opposed to merely an
exercise of taxing and spending powers, and the state could not contrac-
tually bind itself in the exercise of such police power.89
The operating contractors also argued that their grant of rights under
the service agreement gave them a franchise, 90 which, under Texas law,
provides the owner of the franchise with vested rights.91 But the court
held that, while Tejas may indeed have been granted a franchise from the
state by virtue of the Emissions Contract, the operating contractors did
not have such vested rights because they were not a party to the contract;
the Emissions Contract referred to the role of the operating contractors
only in general terms.92 In so holding, the court recited Texas franchise
law to the effect that "[o]ne who claims a franchise right or privilege in
derogation of the common rights of the public must prove his title thereto
by a grant clearly and definitely expressed, and cannot enlarge it by
equivocal or doubtful provisions or probable inferences. '93
c. The Supremacy Clause Did Not Bar the State's Repeal of the
Emissions Testing Program
The operating contractors also argued that the Texas Legislature lacked
the authority to repeal the program, since the program was part of the
original State Implementation Plan ("SIP") approved by the EPA. Ac-
cordingly, "only a repeal or substantial amendment approved by the EPA
87. 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (holding that an attempted repeal by the states of New Jersey
and New York of a covenant with Port Authority bondholders violated the contract clause
of the United States Constitution because the covenant created a contractual relationship
between the states and the bondholders by limiting the ability of the Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey to subsidize rail passenger transportation from bond revenues and
reserves).
88. 292 U.S. 571 (1934) (holding a repeal by the United States Congress of the yearly
renewable term insurance policies established in the War Risk Insurance Act invalid, since
Congress lacked the power to extinguish the contractual rights of beneficiaries under the
yearly renewable term policies, although it had the power to take away the remedy).
89. See Operating Contractors, 985 S.W.2d at 652-53.
90. "A franchise is a special privilege conferred by government upon an individual or
organization which does not belong to the citizenry at large, and in which activity one
otherwise could not engage without the franchise." Id. at 653 (citing West Tex. Util. Co. v.
City of Baird, 286 S.W.2d 185, 187 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
91. See id. (citing Brazosport Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 161
Tex. 543, 342 S.W.2d 747 (1961)).
92. See id. at 653 (citations omitted).
93. Id. (citing Incorporated Town of Hempstead v. Gulf States Util. Co., 146 Tex. 250,
206 S.W.2d 227, 230 (1947)).
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could terminate the contract and end the emissions testing program. '94
In support of this argument, the operating contractors cited Friends of the
Earth v. Carey95 "for the proposition that a delegated program retains its
legal force despite ongoing negotiations between the EPA and a state to
amend the program. ' 96 The trial court agreed with the operating con-
tractors' argument on this point and held Senate Bill 178 inoperative with
respect to the termination clause in the Emissions Contract.97 The appel-
late court, however, was unpersuaded by this argument. The court articu-
lated what it understood to be the correct test for such supremacy clause
disputes, beginning with the basic assumption that Congress did not in-
tend to abrogate state law. This assumption requires a finding that at
least one of the following had occurred: "(1) the subject matter of the
state law has been preempted by Congress; (2) the state law prevents the
achievement of a federal objective; or (3) there is an actual conflict be-
tween the state and federal law."'98
The Operating Contractors court found evidence that none of these had
occurred. The nature of the SIP itself evinced an intent by Congress not
to preempt state regulation, since it "allow[ed] states to regulate dele-
gated environmental programs according to programs developed by state
legislatures." 99 The amendment of the SIP did not prevent the achieve-
ment of a federal objective because Congress itself had recently "passed
legislation preventing the EPA from requiring states to adopt centralized
testing programs."' 00 And the EPA formally approved the TNRCC's
amended SIP in July 1997, evidencing that there was no actual conflict
between state and federal law.101 Ultimately, the view of the Operating
Contractors court was that, as a "reasonable exercise of the police
power," repeal of the emissions testing program was within the authority
of the state of Texas and effective in terminating both the Emissions Con-
tract and the Service Agreement. 102
d. Sovereign Immunity Barred the Operating Contractors'
Contractual Claims
Although the Operating Contractors court dealt with the operating con-
tractors' constitutional claims, the court still needed to address the con-
tractual claims. Since the service agreement had an explicit waiver clause
such that the operating contractors would have no claim for damages
should the Emissions Contract be terminated, the operating contractors
94. Id. at 654 (emphasis added).
95. 535 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1976).
96. Operating Contractors, 985 S.W.2d at 654.
97. See id.
98. Id. at 654-55 (citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981)).
99. Id. at 655.
100. Id. (citing National Highway System Designation Act of 1995, § 348, Pub. L. No.
104-59, 109 Stat. 568 (1995)).
101. See id. (citing 62 Fed. Reg. 37,138-44; 40 C.F.R. § 52.2310 (1997)).
102. See Operating Contractors, 985 S.W.2d at 655.
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based their contractual argument on their putative rights under the Emis-
sions Contract itself, arguing that they were third party beneficiaries.
In overruling the operating contractors' point of error with respect to
the contractual claims, the court cited the recent Texas Supreme Court
decision of Federal Sign v. Texas Southern University.10 3 The Federal Sign
court held that, "while the State waives its immunity from liability upon
contracting with a private entity, the State retains its immunity from suit
unless the legislature expressly waives its sovereign immunity. °10 4 The
Operating Contractors court held with little analysis that the legislature
retained its immunity from any contractual claims advanced by the oper-
ating contractors since Senate Bill 178 "contains language expressly stat-
ing that the legislation repealing the emissions testing program 'does not
waive the state's sovereign immunity or any defenses available to the
state.' "105
The state's success in its Operating Contractors appeal was perhaps es-
pecially notable in part because of the pre-decision publicity that sur-
rounded the proposed emissions testing program and the program's
repeal.10 6 With respect to the specific legal issues considered, the sover-
eign immunity issue may ultimately prove to be the most legally contro-
versial, despite the fact that the court applied the doctrine as barring the
operating contractors' contractual claims almost as an afterthought. As
one of a handful of cases immediately following the Texas Supreme
Court's recent and controversial Federal Sign decision to consider the
sovereign immunity of the State as against a claim by one of its contrac-
tors, 10 7 Operating Contractors may have significance beyond the environ-
103. 951 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. 1997).
104. Id. at 409 ("It is the [ljegislature's sole province to waive or abrogate sovereign
immunity.")
105. Operating Contractors, 985 S.W.2d at 655-56.
106. See, e.g., Garnet Coleman, Only Fair that "Little Guys" in Testing Program Be
Paid, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 7, 1997, at A31 (opining that "[t]here is something bigger to
consider here [with respect to the operating contractors' claims] than the question of pay-
ing the operators. At issue is whether anyone can trust Texas government"); Clay Robi-
son, Many Say Deal Has a Foul Air; Would-be Auto Emissions Testers See No Help in
State's Settlement, Hous. CHRON., July 17, 1997, at Al (suggesting that the canceling of the
emissions testing program "dash[ed] the dreams of more than 40 would-be inspection sta-
tion operators"); Anita Baker, Emissions Deal Seeks Cleanup Funding; State Plan Would
Use Pollution Control Money to Pay Tejas Settlement, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM,
June 12, 1997, at 1 (stating that the decision to pay for the State's settlement with Tejas out
of funds earmarked for pollution control had "angered some industries, who have paid fees
into some of those funds, and environmentalists, who fear that it may affect the [Sitate's
ability to clean up environmental hazards"). For a reaction from the operating contractors
after the appeals court decision, see Janet Elliott, State Appeal over Emissions Testing Pro-
gram Pays Off, TEXAS LAWYER, Feb. 8, 1999, at 12 (quoting a representative of the operat-
ing contractors as stating that the Operating Contractors decision is "fundamentally unfair"
because the State "failed to take care of the little businesses who were brought into this by
the state through its agent, Tejas.").
107. See Michael F. Albers et al., Construction Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 52
SMU L. REV. 859, 859-63 (1999) (noting Federal Sign as a particularly significant and con-
troversial development in the history of the sovereign immunity doctrine in Texas); L.
Katherine Cunningham & Tara D. Pearce, Contracting with the State: The Daring Five-
The Achilles' Heel of Sovereign Immunity?, 31 ST. MARY'S L.J. 255 (1999) (describing sev-
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mental aspects of the case. At the same time, it may serve as a cautionary
note specifically to environmental firms seeking to do business with the
TNRCC. However, such firms may be reassured by the following case,
which demonstrated that a private remediation contractor may success-
fully sue the TNRCC and other state agencies if it is shown that the
agency has, through its conduct, waived its immunity.
2. Sovereign Immunity Deemed to be Waived in a Dispute over the
Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission's Contract with
an Environmental Engineering Firm to Remediate a Contaminated
Site
Engineering and environmental consulting firms frequently contract
with the TNRCC to conduct the TNRCC's environmental investigation
and remediation activities at various sites within the state.'08 In TNRCC
v. IT-Davy,109 a consulting firm (IT-Davy) alleged that the TNRCC had
breached its contract by not reimbursing the firm for allegedly unex-
pected costs incurred while remediating the Sikes Disposal Pits (the
"Sikes site") in Harris County.
The Sikes site had been placed on the EPA's National Priorities List
due to soil and groundwater contamination caused by the dumping of
petrochemical wastes in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Pursuant to an
agreement between the EPA and the TNRCC, the TNRCC in 1990 in-
vited bids from contractors to remediate the site. The planned remedia-
tion was to include "the excavation and incineration of contaminated
soils, sediments, and other wastes, as well as the treatment of contami-
nated surface water and groundwater."'' 10 The TNRCC's invitation (the
"Invitation") included detailed technical reports and specifically pro-
vided, in the words of the IT-Davy court, "that bidding contractors could
rely on the accuracy of the technical data found in the reports."'11 The
TNRCC chose IT-Davy's bid, and IT-Davy and the TNRCC entered into
a contract for the remediation. 1 2 The contract contained provisions such
that if materially different conditions were found, equitable adjustments
to the contract would be made and that contractual disputes would be
decided by arbitration if mutually agreed upon "or otherwise in a court of
competent jurisdiction .... -113
After IT-Davy began remediation, it encountered conditions at the site
that, according to the court, "differed materially from the conditions it
expected based upon the data provided by the Commission in the Invita-
eral sovereign immunity cases decided by Texas courts since the Federal Sign decision, but
not mentioning the Operating Contractors case).
108. For an overview of the TNRCC's remediation contracting program, see Texas Nat-
ural Resource Conservation Commission, Remediation Contracting Program (last modified
Sept. 21, 1999) <http://www.tnrcc.state.tx.us/permitting/remed/contr/index.html>.
109. 998 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, pet. filed).
110. Id. at 899.
111. Id.
112. See id.
113. Id. at 899-900.
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tion, and which conditions IT-Davy relied upon in structuring its bid. '114
The density of the contaminated soil and the level of groundwater con-
tamination were different than that represented by the TNRCC when IT-
Davy had submitted its bid. IT-Davy alleged that the TNRCC required
IT-Davy to conduct more excavation, incinerator stack testing, and dem-
onstrations of incinerator efficiency than were required under the con-
tract, EPA guidance, or than were otherwise necessary. Finally, IT-Davy
incurred costs from flood damage, which IT-Davy claimed under the con-
tract should have been insured by the TNRCC. By the end of the
remediation work, IT-Davy claimed that it was being underpaid by a total
of $6,723,655. In response to IT-Davy's demand for payment, the Execu-
tive Director sent a letter to IT-Davy:
We appreciate the good work [IT-Davy] did at the Sikes site and the
fact that the site was able to [sic] removed from the list of Superfund
sites requiring remediation. We believe we have paid all amounts
due not only under the original contract but also under the numerous
contract amendments that we agreed to during the course of the
cleanup. If you feel the need to pursue additional remedies, we in-
tend to participate in those with the good faith we have demon-
strated over the past several years. But we must decline your most
recent demand for payment. 115
After the Commission denied IT-Davy's request for arbitration, IT-
Davy sued the TNRCC seeking declaratory relief and money damages,
alleging causes of action for breach of contract, negligent misrepresenta-
tion, and quantum meruit/promissory estoppel.
The TNRCC argued before the trial and appellate courts that the re-
cent Texas Supreme Court holding in Federal Sign v. Texas Southern Uni-
versity'1 6 meant that, "because IT-Davy has not obtained consent from
the legislature for this lawsuit, the trial court is without jurisdiction." 117
The IT-Davy court disagreed, however, noting that two post-Federal Sign
opinions issued by the Austin Court of Appeals had recognized that "the
supreme court in Federal Sign left the door open to waiver of immunity
from suit by conduct."'118 As the parties stipulated that IT-Davy had
"fully performed on the Contract and even executed additional work at
the express request of the [TNRCC], that the [TNRCC] accepted this
work, and that the [TNRCC] has failed to fully pay for the accepted ser-
vices," the court ruled that the TNRCC had engaged in conduct beyond
the mere execution of a contract and that this activity had waived the
State's sovereign immunity. 119
114. Id. at 900.
115. Id. at 900-01.
116. 951 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. 1997).
117. IT-Davy, 998 S.W.2d at 901.
118. Id. at 902 (citing Little-Tex Insulation Co. v. General Servs. Comm'n, 997 S.W.2d
358 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, no pet. h.) and Aer-Aerotron, Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Transp.,




IT-Davy has been described by one commentator as one of a "daring"
group of cases since Federal Sign to find that the state of Texas, by its
conduct, had waived its sovereign immunity from suit for breach of con-
tract. 120 As such, it is a notable decision with respect to the development
of the sovereign immunity doctrine in Texas. Furthermore, and specifi-
cally in the environmental context, IT-Davy provides an example of the
kinds of complexities that can be encountered during the remediation of
a contaminated portion of the natural environment and shows how those
complexities can ultimately manifest themselves in court as a dispute over
the interpretation of a "materially different conditions" clause in the
remediation contract.
III. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The 76th Texas Legislative session met in regular session during the
Survey period. Unlike last session, which saw amendments to many envi-
ronmental programs such as the Voluntary Cleanup Program, the Clean
Rivers Program, and the Vehicle Emissions Testing Program, this session
had fewer significant changes to environmental laws. The two most nota-
ble pieces of environmental legislation were Senate Bill 766,121 which re-
vised the state air permitting process, and House Bill 801,122 which
broadened public participation in the permitting process and streamlined
contested case hearings.
The following summary highlights the major environmental legislation
enacted during the 76th Texas Legislative session. Unless otherwise
noted, all statutes became effective on September 1, 1999.
A. AIR
Senate Bill 766-Amendments to the Air Permitting Process
This session the legislature amended the Texas Clean Air Act by pass-
ing Senate Bill 766, which authorizes several significant changes to the air
permitting process. Under the Texas Clean Air Act, a person must obtain
a permit from the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission
(the "TNRCC") prior to beginning work on the construction of a new
facility, or modification of an existing facility, that may emit air contami-
nants. Senate Bill 766, which was effective upon passage, makes five ma-
jor changes to the air permitting process. First, Senate Bill 766 authorizes
the TNRCC to adopt rules to set de minimis levels of air contaminants
for facilities or groups of facilities, below which no air quality pre-con-
120. See Cunningham, supra note 107 (noting that these "daring" post-Federal Sign
appellate court cases had relied upon a footnote in the Federal Sign decision Which had
"intimated a modification [to the sovereign immunity doctrine] by suggesting that immu-
nity from suit may be waived when the State manifests conduct beyond the formation of
the contract").
121. Act of June 18, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 406, 1999 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2626.
122. Act of June 19, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 1350, 1999 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4382.
[Vol. 53
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
struction authorization would be necessary. 123 Second, Senate Bill 766
authorizes the TNRCC to issue standard permits outside the rulemaking
process for new or existing similar facilities if it finds that (1) the standard
permit can be enforceable; (2) the TNRCC can adequately monitor com-
pliance with the terms of the permit; and (3) the standard permit requires
facilities to use control technology at least as effective as best available
control technology ("BACT"). 124 Third, Senate Bill 766 authorizes the
TNRCC to adopt permits by rule for certain types of "non-major" source
facilities that do not contribute significant air contaminants to the atmos-
phere.12 5 Fourth, Senate Bill 766 authorizes the TNRCC to issue a multi-
ple plant permit for multiple plant sites that are owned or operated by the
same person or persons under common control provided TNRCC finds
that (1) the aggregate rate of emission of air contaminants to be author-
ized under the permit does not exceed the total of the rates authorized in
the existing permits for previously permitted facilities; and (2) there is no
indication that the emissions from the facilities will contravene the intent
of the Texas Clean Air Act, including protection of the public's health
and physical property. 126 A multiple plant permit may not authorize
emissions that exceed the facility's highest historic annual rate or the
levels authorized in the facility's most recent permit.
Finally, Senate Bill 766 establishes the procedural and control technol-
ogy requirements for the voluntary emission reduction permit program
that allows the owner or operator of an unpermitted grandfathered facil-
ity to apply before September 1, 2001 for a permit to operate that facil-
ity. 127 The TNRCC must grant the voluntary emission reduction permit if
the TNRCC determines from the information available, including that
presented at any public hearing or through written comment, that the
facility will use an air pollution control method at least as beneficial as
BACT, considering the age and remaining useful life of the facility. Sen-
ate Bill 766 allows a voluntary emission reduction permit to defer imple-
mentation of emissions reductions for certain air contaminants, provided
that the applicant will make substantial emissions reductions in other spe-
cific air contaminants. The deferral must be based on a prioritization of
air contaminants by the TNRCC as necessary to meet local, regional, and
statewide air quality needs. Senate Bill 766 establishes procedures for
issuing voluntary emission reduction permits, including procedures for
notice, comment/response, and public hearing requests12 8 Voluntary
emission reduction permits are reviewed and renewed under the same
provisions as preconstruction permits. Senate Bill 766 also requires the
TNRCC to establish a program to grant emissions reduction credits to a
facility if the owner or operator conducts a special environmental project
123. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 382.05101 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
124. See id. § 382.05195.
125. See id. § 382.05196.
126. See id. § 382.05194.
127. See id. § 382.0519-.05193.
128. See id. § 382.05191.
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to offset the facility's excessive emissions. The TNRCC may issue a vol-
untary emission reduction permit to a facility that cannot reduce the facil-
ity's emissions to the degree necessary for the permit issuance, provided
that the owner or operator (1) makes a good faith effort to implement
improvements and emissions reductions to meet the requirements of the
program; and (2) acquires a sufficient number of emissions reduction
credits to offset the facility's excessive emissions under the program. 129
B. WATER
There were three bills passed this session, House Bills 1074, 1283, and
1479, that pertain to water/wastewater permits and permittees.
House Bill 1074-Accidental Discharge or Spill Reporting
House Bill 1074 amends the law regarding spill/discharge reporting so
that notice given by a water/wastewater permittee to the TNRCC must
include the location, volume, and content of the discharge or spill. 130
House Bill 1074 also requires that notice be given under certain circum-
stances to appropriate local government officials and local media. It also
gives TNRCC more control in determining which spills must be re-
ported. 31 The new law applies to accidental discharges or spills that oc-
cur after January 1, 2000.
House Bill 1283-General Wastewater Discharge Permits
House Bill 1283 amends several provisions regarding general waste-
water discharge permits. It eliminates the law preventing the holder of a
general permit from discharging over 500,000 gallons of wastewater in a
twenty-four hour period.' 32 It also authorizes the TNRCC to issue gen-
eral permits for storm water discharges and gives the TNRCC more flexi-
bility in newspaper notice, notices of intent, and renewals. 33 House Bill
1283 reduces the number of permits to be processed and expands the
universe of authorizations eligible for general permits. 34 Finally, the
TNRCC may now deny a discharger's authorization based on compliance
history.135
House Bill 1479-Municipal Wastewater Discharge Permits
House Bill 1479 authorizes the TNRCC to approve an application to
renew or amend a municipal wastewater discharge permit at a regular
meeting (rather than public hearing) if the applicant is not applying for a
significant increase in the quantity of waste authorized to be discharged
129. See id. § 382.05193.
130. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.039 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
131. See id.
132. See id. § 26.040(a).
133. See id. at §§ 26.040(a)-(b).
134. See id. § 26.40(e)-(f).
135. See id. § 26.40(h).
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and certain other requirements are satisfied. 136 For NPDES permits, no-
tice and opportunity to request a public meeting must be given, and the
TNRCC itself must consider and respond to all public comments.137
C. SOLID WASTE
Senate Bill 486-Solid Waste Facilities
The 76th Legislative Session was relatively uneventful with regard to
solid or hazardous waste legislation. One bill that did pass, Senate Bill
486,138 amends the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act provisions regarding
the role of local governments' landfill siting ordinances in the siting pro-
cess for solid waste facilities. It clarifies the power of local governments
to use landfill ordinances to restrict the areas within their jurisdictions
where new municipal or industrial landfills may be sited.139 Senate Bill
486 also requires the owner of a closed municipal solid waste landfill fa-
cility to remediate as necessary where a release or imminent release of
industrial solid waste is discovered.140
D. RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Two bills were passed regarding radioactive waste. House Bill 2954
abolishes the Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Authority
and transfers its powers, duties, obligations, rights, contracts, records,
personnel, property, and appropriations to the TNRCC effective Septem-
ber 1, 1999.141 House Bill 1172 makes the state's definition of low-level
radioactive waste compatible with the federal definition. 142 This defini-
tion change will allow Texas to maintain Agreement State status with the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The bill also caps fees that may be
collected by the state from generators of low-level radioactive waste.143
E. PETROLEUM STORAGE TANKS
House Bills 2815 and 2816-Amendments to the Petroleum Storage
Tank Program
House Bills 2815 and 2816 authorize several revisions to the petroleum
storage tank program. House Bill 2815 requires an owner or operator of
an underground storage tank to complete an annual tank compliance cer-
tification form 144 and provides civil and criminal civil penalties for certain
violations. 45 It also prohibits the delivery of fuel to non-compliant stor-
136. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.028(d) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
137. See id.
138. Act of June 18, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 570, 1999 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3110.
139. See id. §§ 363.112, 364.012.
140. See id. § 361.118.
141. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 402.004 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
142. See id. § 401.004.
143. See id. § 401.106.
144. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.346(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
145. See id. § 26.3465.
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age tanks and extends certain deadlines for tank owner/operators to
avoid paying increased deductibles on reimbursements of remediation
costs. 146 House Bill 2816 limits the administrative expenses of the petro-
leum storage tank remediation account to an amount specifically appro-
priated for that purpose,'147 decreases the petroleum product delivery fee
on loads of motor fuel by one quarter, 148 and provides for the termina-
tion of the petroleum storage tank remediation account on September 1,
2003, rather than 2001.149
F. AGENCY PROCEDURES AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
House Bill 801-Contested Case Hearings
There were several new laws passed this session that affect contested
case hearings, including House Bill 801-one of the most controversial
and hotly contested bills of the session. House Bill 801 establishes proce-
dures for broadening public participation in the issuing of certain envi-
ronmental permits by the TNRCC and for streamlining contested case
hearings. The new public participation procedures, described below, ap-
ply to an application to issue, amend, or renew a permit that is declared
administratively complete on or after September 1, 1999. Applications
declared to be administratively complete before that date are governed
by the former law. House Bill 801 amends chapter 5 of the Water Code,
which governs procedures for permits issued under chapters 26 and 27 of
the Water Code and chapter 361 of the Health & Safety Code.150 Under
the new statute, an applicant for such a permit must publish notice of
intent to obtain the permit or permit review within thirty days of the de-
termination of administrative completeness. 151 After the initial public
notice is made, the executive director must issue a preliminary decision
on the application, and the applicant must issue public notice on the exec-
utive director's preliminary decision.152 A public meeting shall be held if
requested by a legislator representing the general area where the facility
is to be located or if the executive director determines that there is a
substantial public interest in the proposed permit. 153
A person may request that the TNRCC reconsider the executive direc-
tor's decision or hold a contested case hearing. 15 4 The TNRCC may not
grant a contested case hearing unless the request was filed by an affected
person as defined by section 5.115 of the Water Code. 155 Moreover, the
TNRCC may not refer an issue to the State Office of Administrative
146. See id.
147. See id. § 26.3573(d).
148. See id. § 26.3574.
149. See id. § 26.361.
150. See TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.551 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
151. See id. § 5.552.
152. See id. § 5.553.
153. See id. § 5.554.




Hearings for a hearing unless it determines that the issue involves a dis-
puted question of fact, was raised during the public comment period, and
is relevant and material to the decision on the application. 156 If the
TNRCC grants a request for a contested case hearing, it must limit the
number and scope of the issues to be considered at the hearing and spec-
ify the maximum expected duration of the hearing. 157
House Bill 801 similarly streamlines permit hearings relating to storage
of hazardous wastes, under section 361.088 of the Health & Safety Code,
and air quality permits, under section 382.056 of the Health & Safety
Code, although the new air permit procedures are somewhat different
from the procedure described above because of federal Clean Air Act
issues.
House Bill 2105-Judicial Review
Previously, the Texas Administrative Procedure Act provided a three-
tier sequence for judicial review of agency rules and contested case deci-
sions. Such an appeal occurred first in the Travis County District Court,
second in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, and finally the Texas Su-
preme Court. House Bill 2105 authorizes the transfer of such an action
from the Travis County district court, on its own motion or the motion of
any party, to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, provided that the
district court finds that the public interest requires prompt, authoritative
determination of the validity or applicability of the rule in question and
that the case would ordinarily be appealed. 158
156. See id. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.556 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
157. See id.
158. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 2001.038, .176 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
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